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Investment Certificates
by Leonard Rosst William Finidet and Peter Reuter'
Government control of the aggregate level of new private investment
is an accepted, central prescription of post-Keynesian economic policy.,
When the economy is sluggish, the Keynesian prescription calls for
(among other things) increased investment to stimulate demand; when
the problem, instead, is inflationary pressures caused by excess demand,
the solution is to reduce private investment as well as consumption. 2
But despite wide agreement on the importance of controlling invest-
ment expenditures, the means for achieving control of investment re-
main highly imperfect; they are uncertain in their direct impact and,
frequently, unwelcome in their side-effects. Monetary policy has pro-
duced wide swings in crucial sectors of the economy and arbitrary shifts
in the distribution of income, without subjecting over-all investment to
reliable control. The Investment Tax Credit, not initially intended as
an instrument of stabilization policy, has proved imprecise when used
t B.A., U.C.L.A., 1963. LL.B., Yale Law School, 1967. M.Phil., Yale University, 1968.
Ph.D. candidate in economics, Yale University. Assistant Professor of Law, Columbia
University.
+ B.A., University of California (Berkeley), 1965. M.A., Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1970. Ph.D., 1971. Consultant to Institute of Medicine, National Academy
of Sciences.
* B.A., University of New South Wales, 1966. M.Phil., Yale University, 1971. Ph.D.
candidate in economics, Yale University.
The authors wish to express their gratitude to readers of earlier drafts of this article,
including William Andrews, Philip Areeda, E. Cary Brown, Leonard Chazen, Martin
Feldstein, Franklin Fisher, Benjamin Friedman, Karen Johnson, Simon Lazarus, Paul
MacAvoy, Richard Musgrave, Peter Passell, Michael Rothschild, Jeremy Siegel, Robert
Solow and James Tobin.
1. Cf. J. TOBIN, NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 140 (1965).
2. A simple Keynesian analysis of the economy divides national output into three
components-consumption, investment, and government expenditure. Government stabili-
zation policy may attempt to affect one of these sectors either to offset some undesired
development in that sector, or to compensate for changes in other sectors. Thus, the
government may wish to curtail private investment either because an increase in the
level of investment has threatened to cause economic overexpansion, or because a rise
in government spending or private consumption threatens the same result. Like changes
in taxes or government expenditures, increases or decreases in private investment have
"multiplier" effects on the rest of the economy. (A $1 billion change in investment
expenditures may cause a ;2 or $S billion chanpe in Gross National ProducL)
For an exposition of the role of policy tools in the regulation of different sectors of
the economy see C. SCHULTZE, NATIONAL INCOME AALYSts (1964). Sec also A. OuN, TiE
POLITICAL ECONOIY OF PRosParr (1970).
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in that role; countercyclical adjustments in depreciation schedules stif-
fer from the same difficulty. Finally, changes in the over-all corporate
tax rate are not used for short-term macroeconomic management, nor
could they be especially useful for that purpose.3
One common feature of these policy measures accounts for much of
their unpredictability. In each case, the government attempts to achieve
a target level of aggregate investment by manipulating the environment
of individual firms-by altering the cost of borrowed funds, the avail-
ability of internal finance, or the after-tax profitability of investment. 4
For this strategy to work, the government must guess in advance the
relationship between the proposed change in costs or incentives and the
consequent shift in corporate investment behavior. In economists' terms,
the government must know the aggregate investment equation. But,
corporate investment behavior to date has resisted precise explanation.
Profit expectations, the general business climate, and other unobserv-
able or imponderable data relevant to business decisions seem to pre-
clude the development of a reliable formula relating changes in gov-
ernment policy to changes in investment.5 Thus neither the timing nor
the magnitude of the effects of government policy can be accurately
predicted in advance. Indeed, recent theoretical work has suggested
that even the general direction of these effects may often be unknown.0
This article proposes a novel policy measure designed to reduce this
uncertainty. Rather than manipulate incentives and try to predict their
impact on total investment, the government would "peg" investment
and rely on the market to determine the change in incentives necessary
to induce firms to invest at the desired rate. After deciding on a target
level for the total amount of private investment in a given time period,
the government would auction the right or duty to make this invest-
3. See pp. 1265-66 infra.
4. For a description of the mechanism linking monetary policies to the various forms
of capital expenditure see Smith, The Effect of General Credit Controls on the Major
Sectors of the Economy, reprinted in READINGS IN MACROECONOMICS 227 (N. Kelser ed.
1965). A good theoretical exposition of the way in which tax incentives affect corporate
investment decisions is presented in Hall & Jorgenson, Application of the Theory of
Optimal Capital Accumulation, in TAX INCENTIVES AND CAI'1TAL SPENDING 9 (G. Fromm ed.
1971). A lengthier, more accessible exposition of the same area is contained in Musgrave,
Effects of Tax Policy on Private Capital Formation, in COMMISSION ON MONEY AND
CREDIT, FISCAL AND DEBT MANAGEMENT POLICIES 45 (1963).
5. For a discussion of the comparative performance of competing forms of the II.
vestment equation see Jorgenson, Hunter & Nadiri, A Comparison of Alternative Econo.
metric Models of Quarterly Investment Behavior, 38 ECONOMETRICA 187 (1970) and
Bischoff, Business Investment in the 1970's: A Comparison of Models, I BROOKINGS 'A-
PERS ON ECoNomic ACTIVITY 13 (1971). For a brief but incisive discussion of the problems
of explaining investment expenditures see J. MEYER & R. GLAVBER, INVESTMENT DE.
CISIONS, ECONOMIC FORECASTING, AND PUBLIC POLICY 1-5 (1964).
6. See D. FOLEY & M. SIDRAUSKI, MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY IN A GROWING ECONOMY
(1971).
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ment among firms; the auction price would vary automatically with
the private economy's willingness to make investments during the time
period.
Specifically, this proposal would have the government issue "invest-
ment certificates" which would serve as either a permit or a promise to
invest in new plant and equipment. Certificates representing the total
amount of desired investment would be issued periodically by the
government and sold to firms or brokers through competitive bidding.
If the government desired to reduce private investment, it would re-
quire businesses purchasing new plant and equipment to possess cer-
tificates in the dollar amount of their purchase. The requirement could
be enforced either by denying depreciation deductions to any invest-
ment not covered by certificates, or by subjecting uncertificated invest-
ment to specific statutory penalties. If the government wanted to ex-
pand investment, it would offer subsidies to purchasers of certificates.
These certificates in this case would constitute obligations on the pur-
chaser, or his transferee, to make new investment of the specified
amount within a designated time. In either case, the certificates would
take the form of a promise by the government to pay a fixed sum (say,
$200) per $1000 of new investment in plant and equipment. Bidding at
the auction would establish a price for these certificates of below $200
if some government subsidy is necessary to induce the desired level of
private investment, and above $200 if firms are anxious to invest and
thus willing to buy the right to do so. If the certificate holder or his
transferee failed to make $1000 worth of investment in the specified
period, some or all of the $200 obligation would be forfeited.
In what follows, these arguments will be outlined in greater detail
and the administrative and political problems of the investment cer-
tificate proposal will be explored.
I. Shortcomings of Current Policy Instruments for the
Control of Investment
The current policy measures used to control investment suffer from
two kinds of difficulties. First, their effects are not specific to invest-
ment: they influence other economic aggregates as well. Thus, if the
government attempts to control investment by manipulating interest
rates, there will be immediate ramifications in the housing market and
in the balance of international payments. High interest rates, for in-
stance, will choke off construction of new housing and will cause for-
eign capital to flow into the United States-effects which the govern-
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ment may or may not desire. Adoption of the certificate plan would
free interest rate policy, and other policy instruments used currently
to influence private investment, for other important functions.
In addition to the fact that they incidentally compromise objectives
other than investment control, the policy instruments currently used
to control investment are defective for a second, more important rea-
son; they do not control investment with any precision. To achieve
precise control, it would be necessary to estimate a stable "investment
equation"-that is, a formula which connects the aggregate level of
investment to observable economic magnitudes and policy variables.
The more unpredictable the effects of any given policy instrument on
investment, the greater the likely divergence between the target level
of GNP and the level actually achieved. 7 Using current policy instru-
7. To be more precise, the magnitude of the induced error in predicted GNP depends
upon the effect of the policy instrument in question not simply on investment, but onl
other constituents of GNP as well. Policy tools are rarely specific in their effects on
economic activity; e.g., monetary policy aimed at controlling the level of investment will
also affect consumption expenditures through changes in the value of household port-
folios. It is conceivable that errors in predicting the effect of monetary policy on In.
vestment may be negatively correlated with errors in predicting the effect of the same
policies on consumption: thus, overestimating the expansionary impact of monetary
policy on investment may be correlated with underestimating its expansionary impact
on consumption. This would lead to an error in predicting the effect of monetary
policies on GNP that averaged less than the error in predicting the investment effects
of the same policies. If the errors in investment and consumption prediction were,
instead, positively correlated, we would have the opposite result, i.e., a larger mean
error in GNP prediction. For a technical exposition see Brainard, Uncertainty and the
Effectiveness of Policy, 57 Am. ECON. REV. PA. & PRoC. 411 (1967).
The statement in the text amounts to the assertion that there is no negative corre.
lation between (1) the average prediction error of an instrument on tile sector of major
effect and (2) the correlation coefficient of that error with prediction errors for the
instrument in other sectors.
Consider a simple economy, with only two sectors, consumption (C) and investment
(I), and a simple policy instrument (P).
Assume:
C - a + bP + el
I =c + dP + el
el and eg are random error terms.
Then:
(1) Y = a + c + (b+d)P + e1 + e .The prediction error will be measured by the error variance, denoted by oy2. The
statement in the text is that E ((Y-Yt.,,ot)2) is an increasing function of o12. In fact It
can be shown that:
(2) OY2 = E((Y-Ytarrt)') = o12 + o.2 + 2polo2 where p is the correlation coefficient
of o g~.0,. dolz _
of o" & o.. do,2  - 2o, + 2po..
Only if p<- -1 will control error be reduced by an increase in investment predic-
02
tion error. But it is reasonable to expect the prediction error to be larger for the sector
of major impact, investment, than for the sector of lesser impact, consumption. Hence we
expect o1 >1. Since p is a correlation coefficient, p<l, and we have p>-- '
02 0o
which is the result we want.
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ments and the best available information, government planners risk
missing their target level of GNP by perhaps $10-$15 billion.8 This un-
certainty has obvious costs: if actual GNP falls short of its target level,
unemployment will be increased; if the target level is exceeded, infla-
tion will become a threat. The variance also involves what might be
called redistributional costs. For instance, when the government at-
tempts to stimulate investment by lowering business taxes or reducing
interest rates, income is redistributed toward, and within, the business
sector.9 If GNP overshoots its target, the government in effect has given
a larger "gift" to the business sector than macroeconomic objectives
would warrant.
In addition to these costs of uncertainty, each current policy instru-
ment raises its own particular difficulties:
1. Tax Incentives. In 1962, Congress passed legislation providing for
a seven per cent tax credit for purchase of new capital equipment.10
The credit was originally intended as a semi-permanent alteration in
the incentives for capital investment, serving growth objectives rather
than stabilization policy. But its supposed utility for countercyclical
policy proved alluring in 1966, when the inflationary pressures of the
war in Vietnam had just begun and the President was not yet ready
to ask for an across-the-board tax increase. The credit was suspended in
1966,"1 restored in 1967,12 repealed in 1969,1 and restored again in
1971.14 In addition, the Nixon administration has used changes in the
depreciation schedules for investment equipment as an alternative
means for stimulating business investment.
In spite of the fairly short delay between presidential request and
congressional action in suspending or restoring the investment tax
credit, or in altering depreciation schedules, these devices have not
proved well adapted to stabilization policy. To predict the effect of
these tax changes on a businessman's decision to invest would require
a well-specified and stable investment equation-which, as noted above,
8. See note 19 infra.
9. Cf. Coen, The Effect of Cash Flow on the Speed of Adjustment, in G. Fno.tt,
supra note 4, at 131. "'olicies that produced an estimated $5.1 billion (constant 1954
dollars) in tax savings in manufacturing from 1954 through mid-1962 increased manu.
facturing capital expenditures by only q2.0 billion during the same period; ...... i.
at 179.
Criticisms of President Nixon's economic measures of August 15, 1971, stressed the
redistributive impact of his tax measures, particularly the proposed restoration of the
investment tax credit.
10. 76 Stat. 963 (Oct. 16, 1962), 26 U.S.C. § 46.
11. 80 Stat. 1508 (Nov. 8, 1966).
12. 81 Stat. 57 (June 13, 1967).
13. 83 Stat. 660 (Dec. 30, 1969).
14. 85 Stat. 498 (Dec. 10, 1971).
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is unavailable. Moreover, the frequent changes in tax policy required
to meet changing economic conditions have their own unpredictable,
and often perverse, effects on private decision-making. The firm's in-
vestment plans will depend partly on its perception of the likely dura-
tion of the tax credit, credit suspension, or depreciation provision. For
example, the profitability of delaying investment is far greater if a
suspended credit is thought likely to be restored within a few months
than if the suspension is regarded as enduring. In times of cyclical stress,
the government's own intentions are unclear, and its assessment of
businessmen's predictions of those intentions is triply obscure. But
such an assessment now forms the basis for the government's prediction
as to the likely course of investment. 15
A frequently suggested alternative tax scheme, the Swedish invest-
ment reserve system, suffers from similar infirmities. Under this plan,
corporations may-at their option-place a portion of their before-tax
profits in a blocked government account free of taxation. During re-
cessions, the government may-at its option-allow tax-free withdrawals
of funds for investment in capital equipment or inventories. The plan
creates a kind of reservoir of investible funds, which can be released
at the government's pleasure. In effect, the Swedish reserve system
amounts to a massive, discretionary investment tax credit. 10 Its chief
advantage over the American devices lies in its independence of legis-
lative action, but its precise effects on investment are just as uncertain
as those of American tax schemes. And, like the American schemes, the
Swedish plan may unnecessarily increase the cost to society in altering
the level and timing of private investment.1 7
2. Monetary Policy. Monetary policy is supposed to affect investment
through a two-stage process. Changes in the money supply are expected
to influence interest rates and yields on corporate stocks; these rates
15. For an example of an equation taking explicit account of the difference between
a permanent and a temporary change in investment expectations see Klein &. Taubullt,
Estimating Effects Within a Complete Econometric Model, in FROMM, supra note 4, at
197. The Klein and Taubman model does not, however, take account of the role of
expectations concerning policy changes.
16. See Lindbeck, Theories and Problems in Swedish Policy in the Post-War Period,
58 ANIER. ECON. R1v. 1, 40-47 (Supp. June, 1968) which provides a description of the
Swedish system.
17. The Swedish plan allocates to private corporations much of the long.term riskinherent in the business cycle. A corporation deciding whether or not to use the plan
must predict the likelihood and timing of future economic downturns which would
trigger release of the funds. Since these predictions involve great uncertainty and draw
on no special knowledge on the part of the corporation, the government may have
to pay a high price in terms of tax incentives in order to induce businessmen to
accept such risks. Providing such incentives may involve not merely a transfer but also
a misallocation of resources if society at large is a more appropriate bearer of business
cycle risks than is any individual business.
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and yields, in turn, influence corporate investment. 8 The latter re-
lationship is subject to the inaccuracies of the investment equation. In
addition, the influence of monetary policy on interest rates is subject to
long and variable lags, further complicating the task of prediction.'
Aside from predictive difficulties, the use of monetary policy to
affect investment involves substantial and frequently undesired side-
effects. First, shifts in monetary policy can result in significant re-
distribution of income between borrowers and lenders, and between
society at large and those living on fixed interest obligations.20 Sec-
ond, the housing industry, in particular, bears a disproportionate share
of the burden of a restrictive monetary policy. The tight money
policy of late 1965-early 1966, for example, reduced housing starts
40% from the fourth quarter of 1965 to the fourth quarter of 1966;
outlays for residential structures fell nearly $6 billion during the
18. See note 4 supra.
19. There does not seem to be any reference which focuses on the precise question
of concern to this article: the prediction error of estimated investment equations, as
this affects policy-making. But studies of related questions are suggestive. See Karcken
& Solow, Lags in Monetary Policy, in CoMsILSSIoN O. MONEY A\D CnEDIT, STAIUZArION
PoLiciEs 14 (1963) which stressed the existence of a complex series of lags which, taken
together, introduced substantial uncertainty into the prediction of the effects of mone-
tary policy.
The authors have been supplied with data for the one quarter investment prediction
errors for three major econometric models: Wharton School (for years 19685-70), Univer-
sity of Michigan (1968-70), MIT-FRB (1967-69). In each case the forecasts fall within
the estimation period of the model, i.e., the equation is fitted using data through 1970
and the fitted equation is then used to generate forecasts for quarters prior to 1970,
using only information available in the immediately preceding quarter.
The mean, single-quarter, forecast errors are $1.1 billion (MIT-FRB), $1.3 billion
(Wharton) and $1.5 billion (Michigan). The standard deviations of these errors are
estimated as $.5 billion, $.9 billion, $1.2 billion, respectively. With single.quarter multi-
pliers of only about 1.2 (see, e.g., Ando & Goldfeld, An Econometric Model for Evalu-
ating Stabilization Policies, in STUDIES IN EcoNoMIC STADILMZATION 215 (Ando. Brown &
Friedlaender eds. 1968)) the implied control errors are quite small, $1.5.$2 billion coin-
pared with a GNP of about $1,000 billion for the period and annual changes of about
$50 billion.
These errors, however, are clearly underestimates of the errors relevant to policy
decisions. Genuine forecasts, i.e., forecasts outside of the equation's estimation period,
as would be required for policy purposes, will have a larger mean error. Evidence for
this essentially mathematical proposition can be taken from the Wharton model. Using
an equation estimated on data through the fourth quarter of 1967, one-quarter forecast
errors are obtained for 1969 and 1970 that fall between $11.6 billion and $16.1 billion.
The work of Kareken and Solow points to a lag of three quarters between the actions
of monetary authorities and their initial stabilizing impact. Hence monetary authorities
need to make at least three-quarter forecasts of investment. The longer the period of
the forecast, the greater is the mean error. In addition, a longer forecast period is
associated with a larger multiplier-i.e., investment prediction errors lead to larger GNP
control errors. Ando and Goldfeld. supra, estimate the multiplier to rise front 1.2 to
approximately 2.8; a $1.5 billion prediction error becomes a $4.2 billion control error.
On the basis of these figures and arguments we conjecture that a policy-maker using
existing macroeconomic models and conventional monetary instruments to attain target
leveis of GNP, quarter by quarter, might well find actual GNP deviating from his
target by an average of $10 billion to $15 billion annually.
20. See Brownlee & Conrad, Effects upon the Distribution of Income of a Tight
Money Policy, in Co.tstissioN ON MONEY A CREDTrr, supra note 19, at 499.
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same period.21 Business capital spending and inventory investment-
the major targets of the substantially tight money policy-were far
less substantially affected. 22 As the former Chairman of the Council
of Economic Advisors, Arthur Okun has observed, the government,
through its tight money policy, was in effect using a stiff excise tax
on new homes as its primary tool of macroeconomic control.2 3
The sharp impact of monetary policy on the housing industry has,
at times, inhibited its use for macroeconomic objectives. Reacting
to these extreme results of the 1965-66 crunch, the Johnson admin-
istration decided not to use monetary policy to control inflation
during 1967 and 1968 while Congress was stalling on the Adminis-
tration's proposed tax surcharge. "A stabilization policy," Okun argues,
"that continued to kick homebuilding while it was down and that
once again put enorrifous pressure on financial markets would not
have met social priorities, even if it made prices behave.' 24
Third, the use of monetary policy also has significant side-effects
on financial institutions, especially those designed to serve the hous-
ing market. Savings and loan associations are limited by law as to the
kind of assets they may acquire. The bulk of their funds is channeled
into the home mortgage market. They "lend long and borrow short."2 5
As a result, they are vulnerable to a sharp cost squeeze in times of
rising interest rates, when the payments they must make to depositors
rise while much of their mortgage income remains fixed.20 In order
to safeguard their solvency, the federal government has had to prevent
competition among savings and loan associations for deposits by im-
posing a ceiling on the rates payable to depositors.2" In addition, to
prevent a flight of deposits from savings and loans to banks, the
ceiling on bank time deposit interest rates must be kept in line with
that adopted for savings and loans. The result is a system of restriction
which impedes the optimal flow of savings and sharply discriminates
against small savers. While blame for this difficulty can more prop.
21. OKUN, supra note 6, at 80.
22. Crockett, Friend & Shavell, The Impact of Monetary Stringency on Business In.
vestment, 47 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 10-27 (1967).
23. OKUN, supra note 2, at 80-81.
24. Id. at 85; see also COUNCIL OF ECONOMIc ADVISERS, ANNUAL REI'ORT FOR 1968 at
84-85 (1969).
25. C. KREPS, JR. & D. LAPKIN, IMPROVING THE COMPETITION FOR FUNDS B-rwLrN
COMMERCIAL BANKS AND TIIRIFT INSTITUTIONS 42 (1963). This pamphlet is sumnarized
in an article by the same authors, Public Regulation and Operating Conventions Af.
fecting Sources of Funds of Commercial Banks and Thrift Institutions, 17 J. OF FINANCU
289 (1962).
26. C. HAYWOOD & C. LINKE, TnE REGULATION OF DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES 69 (1968).
27. Regulations with respect to interest rates are issued by the Federal Deposit IIt-
surance Corporation pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (1970).
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erly be apportioned to the rigidities of the law governing housing
finance institutions, rather than to the use of monetary policy, the
existence and vulnerability of savings and loans adds a major social
cost to the use of monetary policy.
A final shortcoming of monetary policy is its impact on our inter-
national accounts. When low interest rates are commanded by do-
mestic growth or stabilization policy, they may nonetheless have to
be foregone in the interest of attracting and holding internationally
mobile funds.28 The Kennedy administration confronted this dilemma
in the early sixties, when domestic unemployment coexisted with
balance of payments deficits. 29 The administration attempted to sepa-
rate the two objectives by decreasing long-term interest rates while
increasing short-term rates, on the theory that the former were more
relevant to domestic growth while the latter determined foreign in-
vestment.30 The result was a massive flow of dollars into foreign long-
term investments. Once more, the experience demonstrated the short
international tether of domestic monetary policy.
Alternatives to Indirect Control of Investment
During inflationary periods, a number of nations have turned from
these imperfectly predictable indirect instruments to direct control
of investments. Great Britain, for example, required in the postwar
period that all major investments in new buildings within leading
sectors obtain government licenses issued according to the govern-
ment's assessments of prospects and priorities.3' An alternative system
could function in the same manner as the American controls on
direct investments overseas which limit investment for each firm to
some percentage of the amount invested during a base year, without
administrative discretion to dictate ceilings for particular firms or
28. See R. CooPER, THE Ecoxo~tics OF INTERDEPENDENCE 157-58 and cf. R. Turyis,
THE WORLD MONEY MAZE 118-32 (1966). cited in CooER, supra.
29. See historical discussion in EcoNo.uc REPORT OF TIlE PRiiES Tr 143 (1969); see
also, SCHLESINGER, A THOUSJAND DAYS 599 (1965).
30. See B. COHEN, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POLICY 155 (1969). R. Cooper, The Interest
Equalization Tax: An Experiment in the Separation of Financial Marhets, FINANZncitivE
447-71 (1965).
31. See J. Dow, THE MANAGE.MENT OF TilE BRiTnISi EcONoMY 1945-1960, at 197 (1964).
Most building work was subject to control until 1955, although "for the first three or
four years after the war the building controls were not an effective restraint simply
because they were not rigorously applied." Id. at 150.
Investment in plant and machinery and vehicles . . . was subject to no similar
direct control. Nevertheless the government possessed some informal influence: there
were various "arrangements, statutory or voluntary, with various sections of the
engineering industries about the division of output of plant and machinery between
the home and export markets."
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industries. But either system suffers from the characteristic shortcom-
ing of any system of central planning: massive misallocation of re-
sources is risked by making economic decisions independently of
market constraints.
II. The Certificate Plan: Fundamentals and Objections
The investment certificate plan, used as an alternative or supple-
ment to the currently available means for influencing investment,
would combine the certainty of direct controls with the use of the
market mechanism characteristic of indirect controls. It represents
no more of an interference with the market economy than does the use
of monetary policy for stabilization purposes, yet its effects on in-
vestment and aggregate economic activity would be more predictable
in direction, scope and timing. The following are the plan's major
features and the objections that might be lodged against it.
A. Administration
The certificate requirement would be applied at two levels of the
production process.32 First, business firms which purchased new plant
and equipment would be required to hold certificates covering the
net amount of their purchase for the period in question (for the
purposes of illustration, the calendar year 1972). The requirement
would not be enforced on an item-by-item basis, but rather would
be based on records contained in the corporation's books. Thus, for
example, a furniture manufacturer who purchased hammers, saws
and paint applicators during 1972 would not have to buy a separate
certificate for each hammer. Rather, his purchases of 1972 certificates
would have to equal the change (before depreciation) in the book
value of his total investment in equipment. Depending on the en-
forcement scheme chosen, failure to meet this requirement could
result either in denial of the right to take tax deductions for depre-
ciation on 1972 purchases of equipment, or other specified penalties.
Second, manufacturers of producers' goods would be required to
hold certificates equal to the net increase, during 1972, of their in-
ventory of finished goods and "goods in process." (Like other firms,
they would also be required to hold certificates for their own pur-
32. The following discusses the case in which certificates serve as a permit to Invest.
The "promise" case (involving a government subsidy for investment) would be handled
analogously.
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chases of plant and equipment as well.) Firms which experienced a
net decrease in these categories would be allowed to sell an equivalent
amount of their goods with a warrant exempting the purchaser from
compliance with the certificate requirement with respect to such goods.
Some goods have both household and business use and are thus not
unambiguously "producers' goods" (typewriters, for example). Pro-
ducers of goods with substantial household use (say, over 20% of
total sales) would be exempted from the requirement of holding
certificates for any increase in inventories of these goods. Business
firms which purchased such goods would, however, still be required
to hold certificates in the amount of their total purchases.
Consumer durables (such as automobiles and television sets) might
conceivably be included in the certificate scheme, but their inclusion
would be less likely to improve the predictability of GNP than would
the imposition of the certificate requirement on business investment.
Consumers who, because of the certificate scheme, are priced out of
the market for durables are likely to increase their demand for non-
durables. Predicting the degree of such substitution involves sub-
stantial estimation difficulties. 33
1. Duration of Certificates
To achieve maximum predictability of investment, the government
would probably wish to limit the certificates' validity to a period
shorter than one year-three months seems a likely target. On the
other hand, high costs might be imposed on businesses if they were
allowed no leeway for error in matching their certificate purchases
to their investment experience over such a short period. A sensible
compromise might involve issuing certificates every month, valid for
three months without penalty and for some time thereafter subject
to a mild but increasing penalty. In this manner, the plan could avoid
the danger of an end-of-the-period scramble for certificates, while still
allowing considerable precision of investment forecasts by the gov-
ernment.
2. Future Market
Since investment expenditures are often planned well in advance
of the day of order or manufacture, firms will wish to assure them-
selves of the price and availability of certificate "futures"-that is, of
33. Extension of the certificate scheme to cover inventory investment and housing
is discussed at pp. 1278-79 infra.
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certificates whose period of validity begins at some point in the
future. Once the certificate scheme took effect, a private futures mar.
ket would undoubtedly develop to serve this need. But the govern-
ment might wish to improve the liquidity and stability of the futures
market by itself issuing certificates of future validity. It might issue
a constant number of certificates in advance of each period, with.
holding the remainder until the period had begun, or it might pub-
lish in advance its best estimate of the total number of certificates it
will wish to have outstanding once the period begins. In either case,
the government would reserve the right to make open market pur-
chases and sales of certificates before and during the period in response
to changes in its own predictions or targets.
3. Issuing Authority
The agency administering the investment certificate plans would
have power not merely to affect the over-all course of the economy,
but also to affect relative distribution between the corporate and non-
corporate sectors. For both these reasons, Congress would be reluctant
to delegate power over the certificate plan to an executive agency.
Yet recent experience with tax rate changes confirms the charge that
Congress itself acts too slowly for optimal macroeconomic control.34
One solution would be for Congress to entrust the certificate scheme
to the Federal Reserve Board, or some other quasi-independent agen-
cy.35 The power to control the supply of investment certificates would
be comparable in scope and political sensitivity to the Federal Re-
serve Board's control over the money supply. Monetary policy affects
the economy as significantly, if somewhat less predictably, than would
aggregate investment control; and it has a similar magnitude of im-
pact on the distribution of income. (Of course, to the extent that the
investment certificate scheme achieves more precise control than does
monetary policy, its administrator would have greater power over
the economy.) If, for some reason, Congress chose not to delegate
certificate authority to an independent agency, it might allow an
executive agency to manage the scheme subject to statutory restric-
tions on the quantity, or maximum and minimum allowable price
of the certificates. The more severe these restrictions are, however,
the greater would be the chance that the certificate scheme would
34. See Ando & Brown, Lags in Fiscal Policy, in COzMmiSSION ON MONEY AND CRDni'r,
supra note 19, at 97.
35. Creation of a new independent agency to administer the certificate scheme would
have the disadvantage of compounding the difficulties of coordination that already
exist among Congress, The Federal Reserve Board, and the Executive Branch.
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suffer from some of the same drawbacks as congressionally set fiscal
policy.
B. Possible Objections
The certificate plan is not, of course, a flawless policy instrument.
Much more would have to be known about its administrative costs
and difficulties before it could conceivably be adopted. The purpose
here is merely to suggest that serious consideration of the plan is
warranted. This article argued above that current policy measures
are inadequate, in type and number, to the tasks assigned them. Here
it notes the major objections that might be raised to the certificate
plan, and argues that they are not fatal to its prospects.
1. The plan will not actually stabilize GNP. Unpredictable fluctua-
tions in investment have merely been replaced by unpredictable fluc-
tuations in the price of certificates. The latter-representing changes in
the government's budget and in the income of the business sector-
will lead to fluctuations in GNP.
This objection is only partially correct: The certificate plan could
not remove all GNP variation due to the unpredictability of invest-
ment decisions, but it could greatly reduce such variation. It is true
that when certificates sell at a premium the corporate sector will lose
income to the government, while the reverse will occur when the
certificates carry a subsidy. But these changes in the government's
receipts and expenditures need not lead to automatic changes in GNP.
Additional budget receipts could be sterilized by the government. As
for the flow of subsidy to the corporate sector,:" this will affect GNP
only if, and to the extent, that the corporate recipients of the subsidy
spend the money in ways which increase aggregate demand. The
subsidy money might be spent in any of four ways: fixed investment,
inventory accumulation, dividend payments, and loans to other cor-
porations. These must be separately considered.
For the economy as a whole, an unwanted increase in fixed invest-
ment will be impossible so long as the government refuses to issue
new certificates to meet the raised demand for investment. Such
raised demand would thus lead only to an increase in the price of
outstanding certificates, or of certificates issued in succeeding periods.
As for inventory accumulation, studies have shown that it is deter-
mined almost solely by expected sales and is insensitive to short-run
36. Analogous arguments would hold in the case where corporations were pa)ing
a premium to the government rather than receiving a subsidy.
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variations in the availability of corporate capital.3 7 Nor should a flow
of subsidy appreciably increase corporate dividend payments: i.e., these
payments are typically tied to a corporation's long-term profit ex-
-pectations, not to short-run fluctuations in cash flow.38 Even if div-
idend payments are increased, their impact on the consumption be-
havior of shareholders is attenuated by the "double tax" on dividends
and, to some degree, by the lower-than-average marginal propensity
to consume of dividend recipients. A flow of subsidy might be ex-
pected to increase loans to other corporations, either directly or
through financial intermediaries. The certificate scheme itself ensures
that these loans will not be translated into increased fixed investment.
But the enhanced availability of loanable funds will arguably depress
the interest rate, thereby producing some increase in stock prices; a
similar increase will also mark the shares of corporations which merely
"hold on" to the subsidy money they receive from the certificate
scheme. Although a rise in stock prices increases the wealth of the
household sector, experience shows that changes in wealth have only
negligible effects on household consumption decisions in the short-
run.30 To summarize, unpredictable fluctuations in the auction price
of investment certificates may induce some undesirable variations in
GNP, but nothing like the wide swings in GNP currently induced by
unpredictable fluctuations in the level of investment.
2. The certificate plan would distort the relative prices between
consumption and investment goods, and between plant and equipment
investment and other kinds of investment.
This is true. But it is not always true that adding a new distortion
to an economy already riddled with market imperfections will de-
crease over-all efficiency.40 More important, the certificate plan is not
37. Lovell, The Determinants of Inventory Investment, in MODELS OF INcOME Di-
TERMINATION 122 (E. Denison & L. Klein eds. 1964).
58. Lintner, The Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained
Earnings and Taxes, 46 AM. EcoN. REV. 97 (Supp. May, 1956).
39. Cf. Friend, Deterninants of the Volume and Composition of Saving with Special
Reference to the Influence of Monetary Policy, in CoMMIssION ON MONEY AND CRLDIT,
IMpAcrs OF MONErARY POLICY (1963). One other effect of the certificate plan is worth
consideration. Corporations, frustrated in their plans to make domestic purchases of
new plant and equipment, might be induced to purchase the shares of domestic or
foreign companies, in order to achieve the desired output expansion or diversification.
Such purchases might run counter to government antitrust or foreign investment policy,
and would put additional strain on the enforcement of these policies. But a government
seriously committed to antitrust, or foreign investment control, should still be in a
position to enforce the law and achieve its objectives.
40. According to "the theory of the second-best," taxing or subsidizing investment
goods need not always increase the degree of non-Pareto o timal distortion In the
economy, assuming that some distortions would exist even witout the tax or subsldy.
See Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. or EcoN.
STUDIEs 11 (1956).
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alone in having non-neutral price effects: All macroeconomic policy
instruments have such effects. Use of monetary policy, for instance,
distorts the market's choice between long- and short-term investments.
To the extent that the certificate plan minimizes undesirable fluctu-
ations in GNP, it should alleviate the need for emergency, ad hoc
measures of government intervention, and thus-in the long run-
reduce government distortions of resource allocation. However, should
the government wish to have no systematic impact on society's choice
between consumption and investment, or between types of investment,
the certificate-issuing agency could commit itself to maintain the
average certificate price at par (i.e., at face value) over the business
cycle.41
3. The imposition of the certificate plan could add a new source of
uncertainty to business investment and thus impose additional so-
cial costs.
This argument is correct so far as it goes. Firms contemplating
making an investment would have to take into account the risk of
fluctuation in the price of certificates, and would thus require greater
rewards to motivate the gamble -.4 2 But the new uncertainty inherent
in the certificate scheme would be offset by reduced instability in
both interest rates and aggregate demand. Since monetary policy
would no longer be used as significantly to regulate investment, vari-
ations in interest rates should be more moderate than those currently
experienced. And, if the certificate scheme is successful in its objective
41. The certificate scheme might lead to one especially serious kind of market dis-
tortion. If no restrictions were imposed on the importation of new foreign equipment.
an above-par price on certificates would induce increased imports. This result might
run counter to the government's balance of payments program. In an), case, it would
increase the uncertainty of predictions about the balance of pa)ments. It would in
addition arouse strong political opposition from domestic manufacturers.
Yet it would be inappropriate simply to extend the certificate requirement to cover
imports. Imports and domestic investment have opposite effects on GNI'; if a single
certificate plan covered both categories, the government would need to predict %vhat
proportion of the certificates would be used for domestic investent and what for im-
ported equipment. Some of the forecasting advantages of the certificate scheme would
be lost.
A preferable plan would be to impose a special tax on foreign equipment purchases
equal to the market price of certificates. This would insure the neutrality of the cer-
tificate plan with respect to firms' choice between foreign and domestic equipment,
without diminishing the precision of the government's control over GNP.
42. Earlier this article criticized the Swedish investment reserve plan for placing on
businesses an extra burden of uncertainty in predicting the future course of GNP (a
business must decide what percentage of profits to place in the investment resere
fund; a rational decision will depend on the expected likelihood and timing of a
recession which would motivate the government to release the funds). But in the case
of the Swedish system, the additional uncertainty placed on businesses would not
yield any certainty on the government's part in predicting the total level of investent
in the period in which the funds are released. Any such prediction would require
knowledge of the aggregate investment equation.
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of iinproving the predictability of investment and aggregate demand,
business firms could operate with reduced uncertainty about a major
source of risk-the general condition of the economy. Over-all, the
certificate plan seems more likely to reduce business risk than to
increase it. Moreover, even if the certificate scheme did moderately
increase the riskiness of business investment, this cost would have to
be weighed against the manifold social benefits accruing to everyone
from enhanced economic stability.
4. The plan will subsidize all investors-not solely those requiring a
subsidy as an incentive to invest. Thus it will waste government funds.
The premise is correct but the characterization does not follow.
The certificate auction market would be free and competitive, and
like all free and competitive markets, it would offer a uniform price
to all purchasers, even though some purchasers would be willing to
buy at a still higher price. Such markets implicitly offer a bonus (or
"consumer's surplus") to buyers willing to buy at higher prices, but
such a bonus cannot validly be considered a "waste" unless a market
which discriminates among purchasers is feasible. In the case of in-
vestment, such discrimination would involve impossible information
and enforcement costs. It should also be noted that current policy
instruments also offer a bonus to investors who would invest even
without special government incentives; lower interest rates and the
tax credit are available to all who invest, not merely to those who
require these inducements to make their investments.
5. Recessions should be met by increases in private consumption or
in government spending, not by subsidized increases in private in.
vestment.
Objections of this sort misperceive the modest function of an in-
vestment certificate plan. The plan does not imply that aggregate
demand be allocated in any particular way among consumption, pri-
vate investment, and government spending, nor that any particular
component of demand carry the "main" burden of macroeconomic
adjustment. The composition of aggregate demand, and the distribu-
tion of the adjustment burden, are vital political questions, and must
be resolved outside the certificate-issuing agency. But any macro.
economic strategy will include a private investment target, and will
be compromised if the target is missed. The certificate plan is de-
signed to improve the accuracy of the government's aim, not to
preselect its target.
6. Within any certificate period shifts in the private sector's demand
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for certificates may render a government subsidy needless, and its
payment may thus be a complete waste of funds.
To understand this point, suppose that at the beginning of the
period a five per cent subsidy was needed to induce purchase of the
targeted number of certificates, but that changes taking place within
the period (for example, in the interest rate, or in the foreign demand
for American goods) raised the market price of certificates above par,
so that they commanded a premium rather than offered a subsidy.
The government, nonetheless, would remain bound by its initial
offering of certificates to pay out the five per cent subsidy. But can
this subsidy be considered wasted? The government was, under con-
ditions of uncertainty, acting to insure results that it desired; the
price it paid for this insurance is no more wasted than any insurance
premium designed to guard against an eventuality that did not occur.
7. The program would involve prohibitive administrative costs.
This may be a fatal objection; only a comprehensive study of the
plan could dismiss or confirm it. In a complicated economy, enforce-
ment of the certificate scheme is bound to require a substantial and
expensive enforcement machinery, and to impose additional book-
keeping and transactions costs upon businesses. We have no way of
estimating these costs, except to observe that they seem likely to be
substantially smaller in magnitude than the costs of running the
stock market and brokerage industry-a set of institutions whose
significance for allocative efficiency has been questioned.
To summarize, the chief difficulties with the certificate scheme
are its novelty, scope and administrative cost; while its advantages
are its potential for precision, its ability to liberate monetary policy
for the pursuit of non-stabilization objectives, and the simple fact
that it would provide an additional, independent instrument of macro-
economic policy to a world whose goals chronically exceed the ca-
pacity of its means for attaining them.
III. The Certificate Plan: Details and Alternatives
A. Scope of Coverage
The certificate plan proposed in this article would be limited to
investment in new plant and equipment by businesses. Equipment
could be given the same meaning for the purposes of the certificate
plan that it has under the provisions of the investment tax credit.
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Investment in plant is not covered by the tax credit, but a definition
of this category would seem relatively straightforward.
Conceivably, the certificate plan could be extended to include
business investment in inventories, or investment by the public in
new housing, as well as business investment in plant and equipment.
But severe administrative difficulties would discourage the first of
these possible extensions. To measure the change of inventories on
a less-than-annual basis, substantial new accounting requirements
would have to be placed on business firms. Quarterly audits and
inventory checks would add significantly to the cost of doing business
for millions of small firms throughout the economy. To some extent,
these difficulties could be eased by exempting small firms from the
certificate requirement. But such an exemption would produce un-
economical substitution of purchases between large firms and small
firms, and might encourage large firms to set up satellite small firms
to hold their inventories.
Fortunately, there seems little need to include inventories in the
certificate plan. The available evidence indicates a low level of corre-
lation between inventory investment and plant and equipment ex-
penditure. Thus, exemption of inventory investment from the plan
would not be likely to tempt firms to divert plant and equipment
spending into inventory accumulation. Most commentators conclude
that the demand for inventories is largely determined by the technical
relationships between inventory 'and production levels, and is strongly
price-inelastic.
A better case can be made for including housing under the certifi-
cate plan. Housing starts, unlike inventory accumulations, are strongly
price-sensitive; there is little doubt that new housing construction
could be curtailed or expanded by including it under the certificate
scheme. Of course, for reasons of social policy, the government may
wish to treat housing differently from other types of investment, and
render it less vulnerable to swings in macroeconomic policy. This
might be accomplished by enacting a compensatory subsidy for in-
vestment certificates used for housing construction during periods of
sharp contraction, or by issuing separate housing certificates whose
supply could be precisely controlled. In either case, however, signifi-
cant administrative difficulties would arise. A large percentage of
housing construction is carried out by small enterprises; it might be
difficult and costly to police their possession of certificates in the
precise amount of the new construction (completed and uncompleted)
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they have accomplished in a given quarter. For these reasons, the
discussion here is limited to the categories of plant and equipment.
B. Effective Date of Investment
In recent investment tax credit legislation, the effective date of
the investment has been the date on which a legally binding, non-
contingent order was placed, while the credit itself has been available
only upon payment or delivery. For purposes of macroeconomic
management, neither date is totally satisfactory. Using the date of
delivery is unsatisfactory since it may come long after the major part
of expenditure for the capital good. But the time at which a capital
goods manufacturer receives an order need have no necessary relation
to the time at which the manufacturer increases its hiring of workers
and accumulation of inventories to meet the order; and it is this latter
date (or dates) which is relevant to the determination of GNP. Of
course, an addition to a manufacturer's backlog orders may affect the
manufacturer's own investment plans, but under a continuously ef-
fective investment certificate plan this effect would show up only
as an increase in premium for future (or conceivably current) in-
vestment certificates, and not as an increase in total investment. Simi-
larly while an increase in backlog might prompt higher dividends by
the manufacturer, this result is unlikely to be immediate or comparable
in magnitude to the size of the increase in backlog. In sum, using
the date of order as the measuring point for investment seems inap-
propriate.
Instead, an ideal certificate plan would define investment as dating
from the time, and to the extent, that it appears as work in progress
in the accounts of the construction firm or capital goods manufacturer.
The full value of the investment would be recognized when produc-
tion was complete. Thus, firms specializing in investment goods would
have to purchase certificates representing the value of any increase
in their inventories of materials and finished goods. The prices they
charged for such goods would, of course, reflect the burden (or bene-
fit) of the certificate requirement.
C. Enforcement
If the plan defines investment as binding orders for or actual
delivery of plant and equipment, the enforcement problems are rather
minor. If, as suggested above, investment is defined as work in prog-
ress, matters are more complicated. The two cases are taken in turn.
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1. Where the certificate requirement applies only to the final pur-
chaser of the investment good. Enforcement of an effective ceiling
on investment could be accomplished conveniently through the tax
system. Firms could be denied tax write-offs for depreciation of any
investment not covered by investment certificates. Ordinarily, the
present discounted value of the right to depreciate new plant or
equipment would substantially exceed the market price for the neces-
sary investment certificates. Some additional penalty would be needed
in order to cover the remaining cases. Enforcement of this penalty
would require little more than the normal audit of the investing
corporation's books necessary to prevent capital items from being
charged as current expenses in order to reduce income taxes.
A more complicated method of enforcement would be necessary
when the government offers a subsidy in return for an agreement to
invest. If the certificate simply represented a pledge by the original
purchaser to make a given amount of investment or to ensure that his
transferee would do so, then the government would have to restrict
initial purchase of certificates to parties thought to be trustworthy
or at least not judgment-proof. In addition, a mechanism would have
to be developed for assuring the initial purchaser that all subsequent
transferees would be likely to comply with the investment require-
ment. While such mechanisms are conceivable, this article has suggest-
ed above the more convenient method of incorporating the agreement
to invest in an instrument with substantial face value, redeemable
only upon presentation of proof that the stipulated amount of in.
vestment has been made. So long as the face value of the bond (e.g.,
$200 on an agreement to make $1000 of investment) exceeded any
likely value of the subsidy required to clear the market in certificates,
enforcement should prove automatic. The only drawback to this plan
would be the drain on credit markets required to pay the initial
premium. This difficulty could be eased by allowing credit-worthy
institutions to buy the bonds on margin, shifting to them the burden
of enforcing the investment requirement on their transferee or re-
quiring full payment or alternative collateral.
2. Where the Certificate Requirement applies to goods in process
and equipment producers' inventories. A different administrative
scheme would be required in order to gear the certificate plan to the
time at which goods are produced rather than time of order or de-
livery. Producers would be required to possess certificates covering
any increase during the relevant period in their goods in process and
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finished goods. They would be allowed to transfer investment cer-
tificates to purchasers of new equipment in the amount of any net
decrease in the two inventory accounts. Purchasers, in turn, would be
required to buy the certificates on the open market if they did not
obtain them from producers. In this manner, the regulation would
ensure that the amount of certificates required to be purchased in
any period would equal the total production of investment goods
(including goods in process), since total production is equal to sales
plus or minus the change in inventories.
A similar scheme would be used if investment certificates were
incorporated in a fixed-value instrument in order to provide a subsidy
for investment. Producers would be entitled to validate the certificate
(that is, to redeem certificates at their face value) to the extent of
any new production during the period. The price charged to pur-
chasers of investment goods would, in normal circumstances, adjust
to reflect this subsidy to producers.
One difficulty with the certificate scheme is that businesses would
have an incentive to alter their accounting methods, or even their
records, to take advantage of changes in the certificate price. Several
considerations, however, limit the likely extent of such alterations.
First, accounting definitions of "goods in process" are already in
common use, and are to some extent policed by independent auditors
in the normal course of their verification procedures. Corporations
whose stock is listed on an exchange are at present required to dis-
tinguish between raw materials and goods in process in their annual
statements. Moreover, since raw materials are considered better se-
curity than goods in process, conscientious independent auditors are
already motivated to enforce the distinction. While it is conceivable
that small companies might collaborate with accountants to violate
the certificate plan's accounting regulations, such behavior in the
case of large corporations would almost certainly run too high a risk
of detection to prove attractive.
Second, explicit modifications of the definition of goods in process
could be controlled by a requirement that the modification be made
in advance of the first period for which it is to be applied, and be
used consistently for several subsequent periods. Similar restrictions
are used to prevent tax-motivated changes of other accounting con-
ventions. Finally, market forces will place some limits on both the
predicted and actual degree of fluctuations in the certificate price;
thus there may often be no strong incentive for altering the time at
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which a given investment is recognized for the purposes of the cer-
tificate requirement.43
D. Duration of Certificates
There are three related questions to be decided with respect to the
time for which certificates will be valid; first, the period of primary
validity; second, the schedule of penalties for use of the certificate
after this period; third, whether certificates should be issued on an
overlapping basis (e.g., certificates valid for a year but issued monthly),
or sequentially.
The simplest alternative would be to issue certificates valid for a
fairly ample fixed period (say, three months to a yea'), unusable
after the date of expiration, and non-overlapping with prior issues.
The government would then know the precise amount of investment
promised (or permitted) during each period. Businessmen would
have to make sure that their investments were undertaken during
the period for which they purchased certificates; if, toward the end
of the period, they found themselves with excess certificates, they
would have to dispose of them on the secondary market or lose their
entire value.
This scheme has three drawbacks. First, it might promote an un-
economic rush to invest toward the end of each period. Second, if
43. Two cases must be distinguished. If the anticipated alteration is one which
must be made in advance, then the invcstment certificate plan will be imperiled only
to the extent that firms agree upon the likely direction of certificate price change and
make accounting modifications which reflect that agreement. (if firms have opposite
anticipations, then the accounting modifications they make are likely to cancel out.)
But the existence of a market in certificates places rather narrow limits on tile extent
to which any given price movement will be anticipated in advance by a large majority
of participants in the market. If, for example, the certificate prices were $100 l De-
cember and were universally expected to reach $120 in January, then firms could buy
equipment in December, hold it for a month and then resell it at a profit hit Jantary.
Either the current price or the anticipated future price will adjust to prevent such
riskless arbitrage. (This example assumes that there is no anticipated countervailing
change in equipment prices; the gap between the current and anticipated price for
goods is also limited by similar possibilities for arbitrage.) If the accounting inodifica-
tions or evasions are ones which can be made after the fact, then the relevant price fluctu-
ations are those which actually occur rather than simply those which can confidently
be anticipated. The possibility of arbitrage restrains actual price fluctuations, as well
as anticipated ones, but not in such an automatic manner or within such narrow bounds.
If, contrary to the argument here, there were occasions when price anticipations oil
the part of potential rule-evaders were focused in a single direction, then orientation
of the investment certificate plan to the time of production might actually alleviate
some problems of enforcement or of ensuring compliance. Assume, for example, that the
date of order rather than the date of production were taken as dispositive. if investment
certificates commanded a premium which was expected to be transitory firms would
find it advantageous to make informal orders for later delivery rather than subject
themselves to liability at current rates. Since these orders could induce suppliers to
expand production, the macroeconomic consequences of the informal orders might be
indistinguishable from those of more formal undertakings.
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the government did not announce the number of certificates it would
offer during a period until the beginning of that period, then the
price of certificates might jump or fall considerably between the end
of one period and the beginning of the next. Some businesses might
invest in the latter part of the first period in the hope that the price
on certificates would fall (or the subsidy rise) between periods, and
that they could disguise or alter the date of the transaction to take
advantage of the new situation. While some incentive to tinker with
the timing of transactions is inevitable in any tax system, the non-
overlapping certificate plan might needlessly aggravate the problem.
Finally, the government might try to avoid this problem by announc-
ing its plans in advance. The market price of certificates would then
adjust to prevent large discontinuities between the price of the cer-
tificates in successive periods. Thus, for example, if the government
announced in September, 1970 that it would greatly expand the num-
ber of one-year certificates issued in 1971, then the premium on 1970
certificates would probably fall close to the level expected in Janu-
ary, 1971 for 1971 certificates. Since firms always have the option
of postponing their investments, few would pay a price in September,
1970 that greatly exceeded the price they would have to pay in 1971.
But, to the government, this policy of advance notice has the cost of
decreasing effective control over the economy. The government's de-
cisions in September about the appropriate level of investment for
1971 are bound to be less informed than its decisions in January.
The end-of-the-period investment rush could be avoided if cer-
tificates did not become invalid at the end of the designated period,
but could be used for some extended period upon payment of a
gradually increasing penalty. Thus, for example, a one-year certificate
might be valid for an additional three months, with a penalty of
one-quarter to one-half per cent of the amount invested per one
week delay in the use of the certificate. This provision would encour-
age certificate holders to use the certificates on time, but would not
make the penalty for delay so great as to encourage fraudulent or
wasteful exertions to obtain the benefit of the certificates. From the
government's point of view, the difficulty of this proposal is that it
would reduce the predictability of investment during any given time
period.
A similar objection would apply to a plan in which investment
certificates were staggered in expiration date rather than expiring all
at once. Suppose, for example, that each month the government issued
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a new batch of three-month certificates. Then, in order to -predict
how much investment would occur in any quarter, the government
would have to estimate how many certificates remained outstanding
from the previous quarter, and how many of those issued in the
given quarter would not be exercised until the succeeding one. A
staggered system would achieve greater continuity in certificate prices,
at the expense of a loss in predictability of effects.
There is no a priori way to decide the appropriate length and
timing of certificates; some experimentation would undoubtedly be
necessary. The choice of terms is probably not too significant, since
smoothing of prices by speculators will probably ease the rigidities
of any scheme.
E. Mechanics of the Auction and the Secondary Market
The mechanism for auctioning off certificates could be designed
on one of two assumptions. On the one hand, the government might
prefer to encourage a fairly concentrated market of certificate brokers
who would themselves undertake the task of distributing certificates
to other brokers and investors. In that event, the government might
accept sealed bids from underwriting syndicates for all or a substan-
tial part of the certificates to be issued at any one time. Alternatively,
the government might wish to deal directly with a far larger clientele.
It would then accept sealed bids in the form of demand schedules,
indicating the number of certificates the bidder would be willing to
purchase at each of a number of market prices. Thus, for example,
a medium-size firm wishing to bypass the certificate brokers might
declare its willingness to purchase $5,000,000 in certificates if they
carried a 3% subsidy, and 53,000,000 if they demanded a 1% pre-
mium. The government would then aggregate the demand schedules
and set a price which would clear the market.44
The government's role in managing investment need not cease once
certificates have been issued. If shifts in government expenditure
44. If the government selected the second system, it would have the opportunilty
to act like a monopolist in tailoring the number of certificates it offers to its knowledge
about buyers' demand schedules. Thus, for example, if the government were concerned
with maximizing its revenue from the certificate plan, it could issue a number of
certificates corresponding to the level at which the marginal revenue from the sale of
additional certificates would be zero. Presumably, however, the authorities would be
more concerned with stabilization than with revenue, and will use knowledge of the
demand schedule merely as an aid toward precise definition of their investment objectives.
Thus, for example, the authorities might wish to hold investment down to $loo billion
providing that the distortion such a ceiling would cause would not exceed that Implied
by a five per cent price on certificates; but at any higher price, they would be willing
to make some sacrifice of stabilization objectives in the interests of allocative efficiency.
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plans, or other change in the economic environment altered the
premises underlying the original issuance of certificates, the govern-
ment could enter the market to buy back certificates or could issue
more. While such a move might frustrate the expectations of certificate
holders, the government should retain the same flexibility to manage
the certificate market that it now has to manage the debt market.
Indeed, one objective of government intervention might well be to
stabilize the price of investment certificates and reduce speculative
risks.
IV. Conclusion
The proposal presented in this article would allow the government
to control directly the amount of private investment in plant and
equipment and thereby avoid the uncertainties and undesired side-
effects of indirect controls now used. Direct government control of
private decisions is often associated with misallocation of resources.
To avoid this problem, the government would auction investment
certificates among firms: each certificate would signify the right or
duty to participate in a total target amount of investment. This target
amount thus would be distributed (through a market mechanism) to
those firms with the most profitable investment opportunities during
a particular period.
The general analysis of the plan presented here suggests that it
could have a variety of advantages, warranting a more thorough in-
vestigation. It would add an instrument to the government's scant
arsenal of macroeconomic policy tools. It would admit of great flexi-
bility in application. In accuracy of impact on investment, and in
minimizing side-effects, the certificate proposal would be clearly su-
perior to the tax and monetary policies currently employed by the
government. There is the danger that it might entail prohibitive ad-
ministrative costs, but only a complete cost benefit study of all its
ramifications could settle that issue.
One thing is certain: the performance of present policies will not
improve even marginally until a stable investment equation is esti-
mated. That task is beyond the capacity of today's most sophisticated
econometric techniques, and it may well prove unachievable. The
time for serious consideration of new approaches is obviously at hand.
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